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(I N RE E&A 11/2, Review by Squa
drito of Watson's "Self-Consciousness
and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals
and Nature")
SELF-CONSCIOUS RIGHTS
The central issue in discussions of
animal rights is the notion of "right".
In "Self-Consciousness and the Rights
of Non-human Animals and Nature" I
consider two senses of "right".
A
full-bodied right is one that can be
possessed, enjoyed, and exercised.
In order to have a right in this
sense, an entity must know that it
has the right, and this requires that
the entity be self-conscious. This is
a reciprocal or "societal" right in that
it implies at least minimal duties among
self-conscious agents to respect each
others'
rights.
Such
rights and
duties are cultural artifacts that arise
in the context of social evolution.
They are "natural" in the sense that
societies could not exist without them,
but they are artificial or artifactual
because members of a society can
decide among themselves about the
content of these rights and their
reciprocal duties.
I n contrast to societal rights that
arise among self-conscious agents as
they interact intentionally in a social
context, there is a derivative sense of
right that self-conscious agents assign
to other entities that mayor may not
be self-conscious.
I call these "legal"
rights, and their distinguishing fea
tu re is that they do not necessa rily
bind the entity that has them to
reciprocal duties.
This is because
many entities that are assigned legal
rights cannot act intentionally as
agents; they cannot exercise rights,
let alone fulfill duties.
Legal rights
do,
however,
bind
self-conscious
members of a society in a matrix of
reciprocal rights and duties.
For

11/4

example, if members of a rare species
of blind shrimp are assigned a right
to survival, they neither self-con
sciously exercise the right lior have
any duties to perform to maintain it.
However, self-conscious members of
society do have the duty not to
destroy the shrimp, and the right to
enjoy the survival of the species.
The key point here again is that
self-conscious knowledge as a basis of
intentional action is required for an
entity to have rights in the sense of
possessing, enjoying, and exercising
them as its own. The legal rights of
entities that are not self-conscious
agents are derived from rights in the
full-bodied sense.
Legal rights do
not benefit or bind non-self-conscious
entities that have them, but rather
make those entities into pawns that
play roles in societies of self-con
scious agents whose intentional social
actions are guided by a matrix of
reciprocal rights and duties.

*****
Let me approach this in another
way. The traditional reciprocity view
is that an entity cannot have rights
unless it can fulfill related duties,
i.e., it must be a moral agent.
I
argue simply that one cannot fulfill
duties unless one knows them, and
thus self-consciousness is a necessary
(but not sufficient) condition for hav
ing rights. Peter Singer (Animal Lib
eration, New York: Random House,
1975) denies that an entity must be
able to fulfill duties to have rights,
but need only be capable of suffering.
It seems to me that the relevant sense
of suffering requires that an entity
can know self-consciously that it is
suffering.
Self-consciousness is log
ically prior to and necessary for the
ability to suffer.
Thus self-con
sciousness is required for an entity to
have rights, even if the criterion is
taken to be the ability to suffer.
Self-consciousness
is
in
fact
a
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criterion of wider scope than the abil
ity to suffer, for one can conceive of
an entity that is self-conscious with
out the ability to suffer, but not of
an entity that can suffer without
bei ng self-conscious.

ownership, and it binds other self
conscious entities Ii ke you and me to
duties not to trespass on the build
ing, and so on.

Could an entity have, benefit from,
and exercise rights without knowi ng
that it had them?
Presumably it
could.
But such an entity must at
least be capable of knowi ng that it
has, benefits from, and exercises
rights. This is because the concepts
of 'having', 'benefitting from', and
'exercising' here imply an entity that
knows the relation of the thing to
itself, and that can act intentionally
with relation to it. It makes no sense
to talk of entities having, benefitting
from, and exercising rights and duties
unless they can act intentionally in
accordance with or against them.

The main issue is that we wou Id
like non-self-conscious animals and
nature to have· some rights. This is
in part because we will benefit from
thei r preservation.
Do they benefit
from it? Suppose the universe con
tained no self-conscious entities that
could act knowingly and intentionally
in accordance with or against rights
and duties.
What
purpose would
rights and duties serve in such a
universe? Consider that in standard
discussions of the ecological balance of
a pond, e.g., the notions of rights
and duties are not applicable in talk
ing of how the balance is maintained
as frogs eat some mosquitoes, fish eat
some frogs, birds eat some fish, and
so on.
To whom are we addressing
our talk of rights and duties when we
dispute about whether or not nonhu
ma 1 animals and nature have rights?
We are addressing each other. We are
trying to regulate the intentional
activities
of
those
self-conscious
agents who might destroy some species
of non-human animals and disrupt
natu re. When we assign legal rights
to
non-self-conscious
entities
or
nature, e.g. the right to be protected
from
unnecessary
suffering,
then
full-bodied rights and duties pertain
to self-conscious agents that do know
they have rights and duties, and that
can be persuaded to act in various
ways. The concepts of necessary and
unnecessary
suffering
here
make
sense only in a context of intentional
actions, and thus do not apply to
nature bereft of self-consciousness.
There is nothing either. necessary or
unnecessary in this societal or moral
sense in a universe with no self-con
scious entities.

This rules out, e. g., a cat own
ing a building, although if a building
were willed to it, there is a legal
sense in which the cat owns the build
ing.
But the cat does not know it
owns the building, and has no duties
to fulfill to maintain its ownership.
And this is just the point.
The cat
has legal rights in this case, but does
not know it has or benefits from
them, and cannot knowingly exercise
them. So far as the cat is concerned,
the good things happening to it
because of its legal rights might as
well be accidental.
Having rights
makes a difference to entities that
know they have them.
To entities
that can not know they have them, it
makes no difference whether they
have rights or not, for nothing (not
even damage or destruction) makes
any difference to entities that cannot
know that they have things, i.e. to
entities that are not self-conscious.
In fact, the legal rights of the cat in
this case primarily involve the full
bodied societal rights of certain self
conscious lawyers and guardians to
benefit from the cat's legal right of

*****

That is why self-consciousness is
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basic in any discussion of the rights
of animals and nature.
Some nonhu
man animals (even cats) appear to be
self-conscious.
But there is little or
no evidence that Nature or the Uni
verse itself is self-conscious or that
there is any World Spirit or Guiding
Force or God in Nature, and there are
good a rguments that mere existence or
life or non-self-conscious (behavioral)
"suffering" does not give an entity a
Natural Right to Be.
An implication
of this "naturalistic" bias is that most
discussions of the rights of animals,
e. g., of battery chickens, are really
about human property. Garrett Har
din is on the right track when he
says "Ethics is the study of the ways
to allocate scarce resources. (This
definition serves equally well for. eco
nomics and ecology -- which indicates
the essential identity of these th ree
disciplines.)"
(Promethean
Ethics,
Seattle:
University
of
Washington
Press, 1980, p. 3). When we assign
legal rights to non-self-conscious enti
ties, what we are really nailing down
are the societal rights and duties of
self-conscious agents in a societal con
text of intentional actions.
We are
determining whether or not the suffer
ing we supposedly cause chickens is
necessa ry or un necessa ry to ou r
(self-conscious) interests.

arm.
You have no recourse against
the tree because trees are not self
conscious.
They cannot do things
intentionally, they a re not agents,
and th us they cannot have natu ral
rights and reciprocal duties in a soci
etal context as defined above.
If
someone owns the forest and allows
you to wal k th rough it, then you
might be able to sue the owner for
negligence.
On the other hand, we
can assign trees the legal right to fall
naturally, e. g. by legally designating
a forest as a wilderness area. Here,
and also in a state of natu re where
there is no self-conscious entity in a
property-owning or custodial relation
to the trees, you proceed at your own
risk, and have no recompense. That
is why the wilderness is a rather
frightening place. There is no socie
tal cushion of rights and duties out
there.
I n the wilderness you are on
your own.
Richard A. Watson
Washington University
(for 1981/82: Center for Advanced
Study in the Behavioral Sciences)

*****
I do not think there are natural
rights in the sense of rights pertain
ing merely because an entity exists or
possesses some natural characteristic,
not even self-consciousness. But I do
thin k a self-conscious entity might
earn or generate or construct societal
rights by fulfilling reciprocal duties,
and that rights in this sense are the
logically prior conceptual foundation of
assigned legal rights that can pertain
to
non - recip rocati ng
non -self-con
scious entities.
Suppose you are walking through a
forest and a tree falls breaking your

(IN RE: E&A 11/3, Cave's review of
Russow's "Why Do Species Matter?")
To the Editor, Ethics & Animals
Dear Sir:
Not being a philosopher,
am
somewhat loath to take issue with
George Cave's review of Russow's
a rticle on the moral status of species.
However, I feel that both Russow and
Cave make a semantic error when tal k
ing about. the "aesthetic value" of
species. The fact that a householder
may recoil in horror from a scuttling
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cockroach or a housefly on the cheese
does not mean that these creatu res
are unaesthetic. They occupy special
ized niches in the ecosystem and
surely have some aesthetic value as
parts of the ecosystem.
The sugarcane farmers of Natal,
South Africa, decided several decades
ago that the black mamba (a poisonous
snake) was a dangerous pest and
decided to try to eliminate as many as
possible. They were very successful,
their success being announced by a
veritable plague of cane rats which
caused heavy damage to the sugar
cane until the snake population built
up again.
The perspective that we have of an
object greatly affects our appreciation
of its aesthetic quality. A human face
may appear very beautiful from ten
feet but not when seen th rough a
magnifying glass which shows the
hairs and pores in all their detail.
As David Hume remarked, "beauty in
all things exists in the mind which
contemplates
them."
(Essays,
of
Tragedy).
A species should not be
confined to a moral limbo on such
flimsy and subjective grounds.
We
can su rely develop better criteria of
each species' ecological aesthetics.
You rs sincerely,
Andrew N. Rowan, SSc.,
M.A., D. Phil., Associate
Di rector, The Institute for
the Study of Animal Prob
lems
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(IN
RE:
review of Frey's Interests anq Ri£b_!~)
The Upshot of Scepticism over
Some Criteria for Moral Standing
~y
book Interests and ~hts,
reviewed by Edward Johnson in Vol
ume II, number 1, is an exercise in
scepticism, on the su dace, about
whether animals possess interests and
righ~s. (and whether there are any
specifically moral rights), but, at a
deeper level, about the criteria for
th.e possession of moral standing.
I
tried to be rath~r remorseless in
tracking down and presenting a case
aga.inst a number of suggested cri
teria, such as the possession of inter
ests, the capacity to feel pain, the
possession of certain mental states or
a
certain
sort
of
psychological
make-up, the possession of desires or
desires of a particular sort, and so
on.
I devoted most of my efforts to
the interest-criterion, both because it
is perhaps the most prominent cri
terion used today to confer moral
standing and becau~e the concept of
an interest plays so important a role
in moral philosophy (from utilitarian
ism to rights-theory, where rights are
not uncommonly regarded as devices
for protecting interests).

My aim was to shake people's con
fidence in the criteria examined. It is
in this connection that I saw my case
against animal interests, my case for
maintaining that a criterion of pain or
the having of experiences or states of
mind is both arbitrary and discrimina
tory, my doubts about whether pain is
an intr.insic evil, my case for saying
that animals lack desires, beliefs, rea
sons, and emotions, and so on, as
relevant .. Nearly all this is negative,
and that IS why the book is negative;
so to speak, I saw myself as contrib
uting something positive to present
moral debates involving animals (and
not just animals), i. e., compelling us
to face afresh the question of the
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criteria of moral standing, by means
of something negative, i. e., shaking
people's confidence in the prominent
criteria examined, especially in the
interest-criterion (and, partly through
it, in the use of pain to confer inter
ests and the use of interests to confer
rights). Because the vast preponder
ance of those who have been a party
to and taken a public stand in these
moral debates over the past five to
ten years have been, so to speak,
pro-animal, I spoke of an 'orthodoxy',
against which my doubts about inter
ests, rights, and some of the criteria
used to concede animals moral stand
ing collided.
In his review, Johnson alleges that
my position does not provide answers
to 'moral questions about how, at least
in general, animal welfare ought to be
weighed against human welfare', and
these questions are, if I understand
the pu rport of his
rema rks, the
important ones. Perhaps they are the
important ones; it is easy to see why
someone might think so. But it is not
true that my position nuver provides
answers to them; it often does, but,
admittedly, in the unusual sense of
forcing us to see that we cannot
weigh what
is not there to
be
weighed.
What I mean is this: the
very way Johnson writes, of how ani
mal welfare ought to be weighed
against human welfare, obscures the
upshot that my attack on criteria for
conferring moral standing can or does
have, namely, that unless this attack
can be deflected, it is not clear that a
particular theorist, in terms of his
own theory, has anything to put on
the animal side of the balance.
For
example, Joel Feinberg concedes ani
mals moral standing because they have
interests; if I am right, and animals
lack interests, then animals lack moral
standing, and Feinberg is left with
nothing to weigh against human inter
ests. Tom Regan's position on vege
tarianism depends upon there being
some moral rights and upon animals
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possessing one or more of them; if I
am right, either about the existence
of moral rights, a topic I explore fur
ther in some forthcoming papers, or
about
animals
possessing
them,
Regan's position is in trouble.
He
will simply be left with our preference
for eating meat and no reason in
terms of his own theory for thinking
it is wrong to eat it.
Peter Singer's
position on animal liberation turns
fundamentally upon the application of
the principle of equal consideration of
interests; if I am right, and animals
lack
interests
(in
the
operative
sense), then Singer has nothing on
the animal side to be weighed against
and to impede the pursuit of human
interests.
The point runs deeper. For exam
ple, I try to show in my book why
utilitarianism, whether of the pain/ex
periences/mental state variety or the
desire-satisfaction variety, has trouble
over moral standing. A part of what
I say in this regard about the former
va riety has a Iready been mentioned
above, so let me pass to the latter.
There are great
difficulties with
desire-satisfaction utilitarianisms, some
of which I go into, if the desires in
question are actual ones; but what is
clear beyond a doubt is that animals
have moral standing in their own right
in such theories only if they have
desires.
If I am right, and animals
do not have desires, then such theo
ries have nothing on the animal side
to weigh against human desires and so
nothing to take jnto account in terms
of the maximization of desi re-satisfac
tion.
Most util ita rian desi re-theorists
today, however, are tempted to move
in the direction of formulating their
theory around rationaldesi res.
But
now animals must have rational desires
in order to have moral standing in
thei r own right; if I am right, and
they do not have rational desi res,
then
the same
result as
before
ensues.
In short, a theorist cannot
weigh what he cannot get into his
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theory in the first place, and if my
attack on the criteria for moral stand
standing I examine succeeds, then we have
strong grounds for thinking he cannot
encompass animals within his theory.
Now I do not deny that some of
this on my side is rather startling;
but that is not Johnson's point, nor is
it in itself enough, I think, to show
that I am wrong.
R. G. Frey�
Frey
Un ivers ity of Liverpool,
Liverpool,�
University of Toronto
Toronto�
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